

SURVEY OF HISTORIC ROOTS OF ARABIAN NATIONALISM AND ITS EFFECT ON JAMAL ABDUL NASSER'S IDEAS

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The area that stretches from the Atlantic Coast in North Africa all the way east to the Persian Gulf in Asia, terminating at the frontiers of Farsi Iran to the east and Turkey to the north, and excluding Jewish Israel, is usually referred to by its inhabitants, as well as by outsiders, as the "Arab world." This concept is of course a cultural rather than a political construct, and consequently, there has been considerable shift over time in the conceptual delineation of the land mass inhabited by "Arabs". By the middle of the 20th century, most of these inhabitants had accepted a definition of "arabness" which emphasized their historical bonds under early Islamic rule, the proximity of their manners and traditions, and above all their ability to claim Arabic as their mother tongue. The nationalist narrators might have disagreed over the relative merits of the other elements, but they all agreed on the centrality of the Arabic language as a unifying force.

To be sure the "arabness" of the people of this area does not exclude other forms of national and sub nation identities. An "Arab" living along the banks of the Tigris River may identify himself also as an Iraqi (his state), a Sunni (his religious sect), and/or a Dulaimi (his tribe). Multiple identities need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. For instance, in his study of Palestinian identity, Rashid Khalidi maintains that intellectuals and politicians in late 19th and early 20th centuries "identified with the Ottoman Empire, their religion, Arabism, their homeland Palestine, their city or region, and their family, without

feeling any contradiction, or sense of conflicting loyalties."¹ However, the narrators of the various identities have tended to project their own as the most deserving of paramount loyalty. The power of the narrative is aided or impeded by purposeful environmental changes, events, and accidents of history- the packaging of a nationalist school curriculum, a war won or lost, the emergence of a charismatic leader. Over time, and depending on the circumstances, a specific identity can become the focus of peoples loyalties, while other identities are marginalized, even excluded. As we shall see, during the 1950s and 1960s Arab nationalism became the people's focus of loyalty to such an extent that other identities were not only marginalized, but indeed were turned into negative, even derogatory, notions. This was no longer the case by the end of the twentieth century, when Arab nationalism seemed to have been eclipsed not only by strong Islamic sentiment, but also by state and substrate identities; still, throughout the second half of the century, people continued to cling to their "arabness," albeit with varying degrees of intensity. To call the area the "Arab" world, therefore, need not raise any eyebrows. To say someone is an Arab should not be a point of controversy. And on the whole it was not. What was vigorously debated was the question pertaining to the origins and political manifestations of this identity: when was it that the inhabitants of the area began to feel that they constituted (or should constitute) a "nation"; when was it, to use the terminology of Ernest Renan and Benedict Anderson, that they imagined themselves to constitute a deep, horizontal solidarity deserving of political recognition?² This is not an esoteric debate conducted within

¹ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 19.

² Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, (London: Routledge, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1990).

the annals of historiography, with no relevance to our understanding of contemporary Arab politics. If national identity emerges as a result of purposeful narrative, then it is essential to comprehend accurately when the narrative began, for its later development and contemporary impact has to have something to do with the intellectual, ideological, and political influence under which it emerged.

Of course, some form of Arab consciousness has existed throughout the history of the Arabs, Albert Hourani sees in the life of Ibn Khaldun, the great fourteenth century Arab philosopher, an allegory for the cultural space that was the domain of the Arabs. Ibn Khaldun's life, Hourani tells us, says something about the world to which he belonged: a world where a family from southern Arabia could move to Spain, and after six centuries return nearer to its place of origin and still find itself in familiar surroundings, had a unity which transcended divisions of time and space; the Arabic language could open the door to office and influence throughout that world; a body of knowledge, transmitted over the centuries by a known chain of reaches, preserved a moral community even when rules changed; places of pilgrimage, Mecca and Jerusalem, were unchanging poles of the human world even if power shifted from one city to another; and belief in a God who created and sustained the world could give meaning to the blows of fate.³

So it was Islam and the Arabic language that preserved this sense of belonging through the ages, a process that gained vast impetus with the magnificent flowering of culture in the Arab Islamic empires that grew out of the Muslim conquests. It was then that Baghdad of the Abbasids, Cairo of the Fatimids, Qairawan of the North African Aghlabids, and Cordoba of the Spanish Umayyad were the centers of

³ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York: Warner Books, 1991), p. 4.

dazzling civilizations at a time when Europe was mired in illiteracy, poverty, and disease.

But by the dawn of the sixteenth century, the Arabs were no longer the primary bearers of power and culture. Their empires and civilizations had disintegrated and they lay ready to be devoured by new and aggressive social solidarities eager to expand their power and domain. It was one such group, The Turkish Ottomans that was destined to rule over the Arabs for the next five centuries. Very soon, Constantinople, not the famed Arab cities, would become Islam's center of gravity, and in the Friday prayers, the voice of Mu'azzins in Arab cities and towns would invoke the blessings of Allah not for Arab rulers, but for the Turkish sultan. At times, the political and military reach of the Ottoman Turks seemed limitless. The great sixteenth century Ottoman sultan, Sulayman, known as "the Magnificent," would address a letter to the King of France which began, "I who am Sultan of Sultans, Sovereign of Sovereigns ... the shadow of God on earth, the Sultan and Sovereign Lord of the White Sea and the Black Sea, of Rumania, Azerbaijan, Persia, Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Arabia, Yemen and many other lands ... with my August Majesty has made subject to my flaming sword and my victorious blade. I, Sultan [Sulayman] Khan ... to thee, who are Francis, King of the land of France."⁴

It is interesting, however, that this pervasive power of the Turks over Arab lands and populations in no way diminished the place of the Arabic language. In fact, the Ottomans, Muslims themselves, regarded Arabic as the sacred language, according it due respect and deference,⁵

⁴ Anthony Nutting, *The Arabs: A Narrative History from Muhammed to the Present* (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 212.

⁵ H. A. R. Gibb, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 160.

and so while Turkish became the language of government and bureaucracy, Arabic retained its elevated status as the medium for law and religious studies more often than for history and biography.⁶ So it was the Arabic language, and its unrivaled status as the language of the Qur'an, which nourished and sustained a sense of cultural proximity in the Arab lands of the empire throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule.

Instrumental in this process, paradoxically enough was the West. As far back as the sixteenth century, the Rome papacy began to establish colleges for training priests of the eastern churches, a number of which incorporated the study of Arabic into their theological and historical explorations and commentaries. This process was accelerated in the nineteenth century in the Levant under the enlightened rule of Ibrahim Pasha who encouraged Western missionaries and educationists to open schools and other educational institutions. To remedy the shortage of Arabic texts these institutions imported their own printing presses. All this led to an Arabic literary revival, which was to become the basis for the early nationalist stirrings in the Arabic – speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

Thus it is hardly surprising that the intellectual seeds of twentieth century Arab nationalism should be traced to the ideas and endeavors of a number of nineteenth century thinkers and activists. Muslims and Christians, their central focus was the contemporary condition and future aspirations of the Arabic- speaking citizens of the Ottoman Empires. Their eyes were opened by the expansion of education to the growing nationalist movements in the Balkan lands of the Empire, these early Arab writers and political agitators tended to focus on the ethnic and linguistic differences that separated the Arabs from their Turkish

⁶ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798- 1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 239.

rulers. As we shall see, this ethnic separateness was much stronger among the Christians than the Muslims; the latter being tied to Istanbul by the bond of religious belief, and therefore much more concerned with the creeping cultural and political domination of Christian Europe. Perhaps the earliest of these thinkers and political agitators, whose writings and activities were held in great reverence by the Arab nationalists of the twentieth century, were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and his pupil Muhammad 'Abdu (1849-1905). Admittedly, neither spoke directly to Arabism, for Afghani and 'Abdu were essentially Islamic reformers who recognized and feared the cultural threat of the Christian West, and sought ways to confront this threat through advocating Islamic reform, resurgence, and unity. Their purpose was to regenerate the stagnant Muslim society, and to educate it into adapting to the ideas and institutions of the modern world. They argued that the arsenal of the West's undoubted contemporary superiority - philosophy, mentality, and science- were not only compatible with Islam, they in fact were imbedded in the very essence of the Muslim faith. To Afghani, "Islam was in harmony with the principles discovered by scientific reason, was indeed the religion demanded by reason."⁷ Thus, it was not Islam per se, but the Muslims' intellectual backwardness, brought about by centuries of subjugation and neglect, as well as the disunity of the Islamic Umma, that was responsible for the inferior status of the Muslim world.⁸ Time and again

⁷ Ibid., p. 123.

⁸ For analyses of the ideas of Afghani and Abdu, see Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 103-160; Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics* (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 56-65; Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 43-46, 62-75; Sylvia Haim, ed. *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1962), pp. 6-20.

the two reformers would enjoin Muslims not to blindly initiate the West, but to delve into the real meaning of their religion, study it well, and model their lives on its teachings. If that were to happen, the world of Islam would be strong again.⁹ It was this determined declaration of authenticity, this unambiguous reiteration of cultural independence, even superiority, that later would spur twentieth century nationalists to consider Afghani and 'Abdu as having contributed to the Arab nationalist cause.¹⁰

If this is to be the case, however, the most that could be said about Afghani and 'Abdu is that they were Arab nationalists by implication, and even that is tenuous at best. According to the eminent Arab historian, Nicola Ziadeh, Afghani single-mindedly advocated the concept of the Islamic Umma (Islamic community) at the expense of the national state. The Umma, according to Afghani, constituted all Muslims, regardless of their countries, nationalities, and languages.¹¹ Abdu, too, "always spoke of and to the Ummain the traditional sense of the community of all Muslims."¹² As for Arab national and linguistic bonds, these were dismissed by Afghani, who insisted that Muslims had but one nationality: their religion.¹³

⁹ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 113.

¹⁰ See the thorough summary of such opinions by Elie Chalala, "Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographical Essay," in *Pan Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate*. Ed. Tawfic E. Farah. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 24-25.

¹¹ Nicola Ziadeh, *Shamiyat: Dirasat fi al-Hadhara wa al-Tarkh* (Shamiyar: studies in culture and history) (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1989), pp. 287-288.

¹² Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 75.

¹³ See Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, *Ma Hiya al-Qawmiya?: Abbath wa Dirasat 'ala Dhaw'I al-Ahdath wa al-Nadhariyat* (What is nationalism?: enquiries and studies in light of events and theories) (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm li al-Malayeen, 1959), p. 221.

To Afghani and 'Abdu, "the religion of Islam is the one bond which unites Muslims of all countries and obliterates all traces of race or nationality."¹⁴ Indeed, they were adamant that it was the "foreigners" who touted secular nationalism in order to divide the Muslim Umma. Nationalism thus was "conceived as a divisive rather than a unifying spirit - a cover, in fact, for tyranny and injustice."¹⁵ Moreover, neither Afghani nor 'Abdu was particularly hostile to Ottoman rule over Arab lands.¹⁶ Indeed, Afghani was Persian by birth, and if any nationalism, beyond Muslim unity, is to be implied from 'Abdu's writings, it would be Egyptian rather than Arab. More perceptible "Arabist" proclivities are found in the writings of another leading Islamist, Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Rida's writings on the structure and reform of the Islamic world tended to give Arabs pride of place. To Rida, the Arabic language was the only language "in which the doctrines and laws of Islam could be thought about."¹⁷ Accordingly, to invest the office of the "Khalifa" with the Ottoman rulers in Istanbul was a travesty. Indeed, Rida goes even further by insisting that Islam, in fact, "had been undermined by the Ottoman rulers."¹⁸ After all, was it not the Turks who tyrannized the community, killing even the "Khalifas"? Worst of all, in Rida's eyes, the Turks "usurped the [office of the Khalifa] from the 'Abbasids and so took it out from the hands of the **Quraysh** clan which had been chosen by

¹⁴ Quoted in Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad 'Abduh* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 59.

¹⁵ Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 138-139.

¹⁶ Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 18-26; Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 7-21.

¹⁷ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 240.

¹⁸ Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World*, p. 181.

God to spread the Qur'an over the world, after it had given Islam its prophet, its language, and its adherents."¹⁹

And while the Ottomans had certainly built a great empire, it is dwarfed by the rarely Arab conquests. In an article Rida wrote in 1900, in which he evaluates Arab and Ottoman conquests, he is adamant in preferring the former: "I want to say that the greatest glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and that religion grew, and became great through them; their foundation is the strongest, their light is the brightest, and they are indeed the best Umma."²⁰ In these and other writings there is no mistaking the conscious ethnic distinction between the Arabs and the Ottoman Turks, in which the pride of place goes to the Arabs. Indeed, later on, in the wake of the 1916 Arab revolt, Rida advocated political separation and statehood for the Arabs, which, he argued, would be of benefit to all Muslims.²¹

Yet here again, as in the case of Afghani and 'Abdu, Rida's primary concern was with the realm of Islam. Whatever arguments and recommendations he proposed were primarily aimed to serve the interests and glorification of Islam. If "arabism" appeared as an element of Rida's writings, it was at best a corollary force to be used solely for the rejuvenation of Islam and the Muslim Umma. The cause of Arabism was in no way meant to super cede that of the wider Islamic solidarity, and so his antagonism toward the "Turkish usurpers" was not meant to undermine the Ottoman Empire, for he saw the continued health of the Empire as strength for Islam.²²

¹⁹ Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, p. 181.

²⁰ Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley :university of California Press,1962), pp. 22-23.

²¹ Anis al-Abyadh, *Rashid Rida: Tarikh wa Sira* (Rashid Rida: history and biography) (Tripoli: Jarrus Press, 1993), p. 53.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

Consequently, Rida remained committed to his Ottoman nationality until the last years of World War I when Ottoman defeat loomed in the horizon. Indeed, Rida was proud that in a nationalist age, the Arabs were the last ethnic group to feel its stirrings "because the vast majority of them are Muslims feeling almost nothing but their religious identity."²³ Rida, in fact, was very much against doctrinal nationalism, seeing it as a Western-inspired as salute against the solidarity of the Islamic Umma. To Rida, nationalism was "not only a new source of dissension among Muslims, but something close to apostasy."²⁴ In 1911 he submitted a memorandum to the Ottoman authorities recommending the establishment of a *Madrasat al-Da'wa wa al-Irshad* (School of Religious Persuasion and Instruction), in which "students would be selected from promising candidates in the Muslim countries, especially those in need of Islamic knowledge, such as Java, China and North Africa. The [school] would emphasize morals, manners and a spirit of unity, eschewing both racial nationalism and politics."²⁵ An attachment to a "homeland" was permissible only if it served the interest of the broader Muslim community. "A Muslim," Rida told his coreligionists, "is a member of a body bigger than his people, his own personal homeland is only a part of his religious homeland, and he must therefore seek to make the progress of his part toward the progress of the whole."²⁶ In Rida's scheme of things, ethnic nationalism, including Arab nationalism,

²³ Quoted in Zeine Nur al- Din Zeine, *Nushu' al-Qawmiya al-'Arabiya ma'a Dirasa Tarikhtya fi al-I laqat al-'Arabiya al-Turkiya* (The emergence of Arab nationalism with a historical study of Arab-Turkish relations) (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr, 1979), p. 43.

²⁴ Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, p. 82; see also Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, p. 183.

²⁵ Jacob M Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 126.

²⁶ Rashid Rida, "Islam and the National Idea," in *al-Manar*, vol. 23 (1933): 192, to be found in Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, p. 76.

in no way would be advocated as an autonomous ideological formulation; it would be tolerated only when it was put at the service of a higher purpose, namely, the bringing together of global Islamic solidarity.

A more forthright and politically conscious ethnic separation of Arab from Turk can be discerned from the writing of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi from Syria (1849-1903). In his book, *Umm al-Qura* (Mother of the Cities), a traditional name for Mecca, Kawakibi berates the Turks for introducing practices into the Umma which led to the decadence of Islam, adding that the abode of Islam would have been better off had the Turks not embraced the faith.²⁷ He then goes so far as to advocate a shift in the balance of power from the Turks to the Arabs by bringing back the caliphate to al-Hejaz, where an Arab from the line of Quraish would be elected by representatives of the Islamic community. Kawakibi rationalizes what amounts to an incendiary proposal by reference to the central position of the Arabs, and especially their language, in Islam.²⁸ He adds that, unlike other Muslims, the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, not having been weakened by racial and sectarian divisions, continued to constitute a true solidarity, and were the most zealous in preserving their religion. The Arabs, Kawakibi maintained, are "of all nations the most suitable to be an authority in religion and an example to the Muslims; the other nations have followed their guidance at the start and will not refuse to follow them now."²⁹ In advocating placing religious authority in the hands of the Arabs, Kawakibi, more than Rida, infuses a quasi-political dimension to his anti-Turkish sentiment, which is crystallized by his insistence on the transfer of the caliphate to al-Hejaz.

²⁷ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), p. 126.

²⁸ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 272-273.

²⁹ Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, p. 27.

1. Arabs Conditions during Encounters with Western Oppression.

In early years of 19th century, by the roar of Napoleon's cannons in Egypt, Arab age of Neocene comes into existence. It is likely that nationalistic movements find meaning against 'Other', and 'Strong items'. The Significant point here is the Synchronism between "Western oppression" and making Arabs feel they are undeveloped comparing to other countries. It seems that stranger poses itself explicitly and nakedly in order to make a nation be aware of its position in the world. The first encounter between Arabs and westerners was the final strike on the ancient and luxurious structure but decayed Islamic-Arab civilization.

Yusef Alshoviri states in "Arab Nationalism: historical approach to government and nation in Arab world": "One of the main factors for Islamic world undevelopment after 16th century AD is conservative state of Othman Sufis and Mongols due to patrimonial nature of dominating systems. At the same time, European Continent was experiencing political entities within government-nation, reforms and secularism. On the other hand, Arabs were emphasizing more Islamism than Arab nationality and identity as they had left the dominance to Othman Turks."³⁰

In other words, Arabs considered themselves Muslim rather than Arabs until their encounter with western civilization. Zalman Isakowich writes in "New Socio-movements and Thoughts in Arab World": "Of Arab history features is the fact that Arab countries being conquered by Othman Turks in 16th and 17th centuries were governed by Turks for 4 centuries. However the rate of obeying 'Istanbul' varied. No countries in

³⁰ Yusef Alshoviri: " Arab Nationalization ..." from Did (digital library) site, Tehran international investigations and Research Institute www. Did. Ir/ june 20 2004.³⁰

the world were inured except local areas of Arab peninsula and Oman (the farthest eastern part of Arab world).³¹

Othman regime was based on three ideologies: admitting superior dominance of Othman king religious orthodoxies; the idea of Muslims superiority on Christians due to political overcoming of Muslims; and priority of religious links to other links.³²

This is how emperor ruled Arabs: absolute ruling of emperor's alderman's in Arab provinces for one century. New government centers in independent and semi- independent emirates were formed for example from 1749 to 1831 Bagdad and Basra were administered by oligarchy of "kerlimi emperors" (white slaves) who were basically independent from Ottoman Empire. But Egypt having been governed by Turks until 1805 was practically colonized by Mamluks and deemed as typical anarchy and disorder of feudal system.³³

These amirs were the absolute power in such areas. They set taxes and had permanent forces in their own realms. They had invasive policies against their neighboring areas. Although opposing sultan's central government, they hold centralized policies in their own emirates.

Ottoman's failure to establish a legal system in their territories made the dwellers demand support. People could stand greediness of their amirs against their comfort and welfare. Arabs disregarded new relations between specific areas in Othman empire and central government. An Italian missionary wrote about Iraq situations: "Moosel dwellers didn't tend to Turks absolute dominance, instead they called

³¹-Zalman Isakowich: "New social political movements and thoughts in Arab world", translated by yusef Azizi, Scientific and Cultural publication, Tehran 1999, p. 3.³¹

³²_ See Hourani . A " The Changing face of the fertile crescent in XVIII century studies" t. larosse. Paris 1957

³³ Zalman Isakowich, p. 10.

³⁴ See: Hourany A.

for their Arab identities".³⁴ This social ground was not based on a given thought and knowledge, but on socioeconomic conditions of Arabs under Turks dominance. However it was a basis for thinking evolution in westerners' entrance.

The independence of feudal rulers increased by intense crisis in feudally and Miltonic system. In most Ottoman lands there were no appropriate control and ottomans decline was equal with Arab decline. In late 19th century, Ottoman Empire faced a critical stage which included all economic, military and governmental sectors. This crisis was the result of feudally-military system and agricultural economy collapse. Corruption was seen in all governmental authorities, and conflict among super land owners as well as independence inclinations increased. It caused rupture in this great empire.

The conditions above were for Arabs too, because they lack an Arab governing system and government-nation relation in its modern sense. Decline could be felt for Arab culture. Wolti writes: "Neither "Zandiqis", nor skepticisms were found. Suspicious, customs and falsehoods played vital role in people's life. These people respected every ancient thing. Ignorance and foolishness were boarded. Training children was limited to teaching and reading Quran or religious songs, a little writing and counting ... Syria's two libraries at that time were filled with the books with religious content, syntax and so on. Egyptian libraries were the same with a little higher variety."³⁵

It was the time to hear westerners foot sound. This sound had 2 sides: 1) invasion and possession; 2) awakening and time for thinking of Arabs slept conscience about their destiny.

³⁵ Ibid p. 4.

In early years of 19th century, the first signs of new political thoughts and movements appeared in Arab world. This violent social phenomenon-which resulted in various changes in socio-political structure of several Arab countries-, was first seen in Egypt.

2. Early Influences by West on Arabs (by Relying on Egypt)

Oppression in non-Arab countries and in western lands during contemporary ages has had 2 faces: 1) exploiting and conquering lands and resources of those areas; 2) a way to identify and understand changes occurred in developed Europe. Oppression brought up new thoughts for dwellers of undeveloped lands under foreigners dominance. These thoughts blew evolutionary and awakening spirit of those people. They could also provide means to fight with western oppressors. This is the approach of Arab Nationalism.

Karl Marx explained oppression in 1853 AD as follows: "Although Britain followed its worst benefits in creating a social revolution in India the question is if human beings could make their destinies true without a fundamental revolution in social situations of Asia.³⁶

For Marx this revolution for a classless society couldn't be possible without changing a traditional, non modern and economy-feudal-agricultural based country into a modern, capitalistic and bourgeoisie society. Oppression plays the same role in non-Arab Asian and African countries.

Napoleon's entrance to Egypt and 3 successful years of his presence there shook this ancient and civilized land and caused a new evolution in this area. Napoleon's dreams for this territory were not

³⁶ Peter singer, 'Marx', Oxford University, 1980, p. 77.

limited. First it seemed his considered territory would be only Alexandrian coast lines but then he dreamed about conquering vast lands in Middle East.

At that historical time, Egypt was a semi-independent province related to Ottoman Empire and governed by Mamluks. Egypt was passing its collapse age in economic, political and military status. In addition, its religious and cultural proud was also shaken. During 1798-1801 Egypt was deemed as France colony and consequently took the forms and faces of western civilization.

As stated on previous parts, the grounds for accepting so were felt long before decline of empire. Besides Napoleon, many engineers, doctors, archeologists, and experts came to the land in order to create cultural revolution in Egypt society.

Entering printing houses to Egypt was among Napoleon's services in this land to publish some masterpieces of Egypt culture and literature. But Egyptian rulers did not want printing old texts but translating and publishing social and political ideas of western society and making them accessible for literate people who were frustrated with weakness and undevelopment of the country.

The interesting point here was poverty, weakness, undevelopment of Arab societies in hardware. Russian Consul in Beirut in the mid 19th century writes, "Muslims all over Syria do not have even one printing house."³⁷ So we can understand the welcoming of Arab evolutionist generation of any modernization even to the extent of completely materialistic effects of a developed civilization not only in Egypt but also throughout Arab studying the way of resorting Egypt. Politically and officially, and constricting some small factories are other

³⁷ See K. M. Bazili, "Syria and Palestine under Turks dominance from historical and political aspects" chapter 2, St. Petersburg 1862

changes in Egypt during this time. So that France occupied the land with its troops and entered its technology and culture there. The other factor was Mohammad Ali's government in Egypt during 1805-1849 AD. During Mohammad Ali's dominance over Egypt, he could apparently expel French occupiers from this land. At the same time accepting western civilization became faster in the land. This ottoman commander with Albanian origin had indeed imposed his dominance on ottoman king (sultan Salim). Although he pretended to be ottoman follower, he did not instinctively obey their old and sick authorities. Egypt can be considered as a separated province from empire structure which was ruled by Mohammad Ali pasha at that time.

Several Egyptian land owners who were displeased with ottoman Turk owners and rulers, and some leading merchants who attempted to have a centralized country helped and supported Mohammad Ali to get power. Mohammad Ali's reforms and his reformist attempts to develop Arab ideological training and production forces motivated Arabs. He tried to take advantage of European techniques and scientific results in order to establish new marine and military forces. It needed fundamental change in entire economic structure of the country, and opened a new way to Egypt to achieve new culture and approach. Clot Beck, who spent many years at Mohammad Ali's service, writes: "Obviously European troops and military appliances of Egypt enabled this land to take continuous steps into civilization ... The European type of public and professional schools was that strangers were legally appointed to teach in such schools."³⁸ In 1809, he sent several youngsters to Europe and mostly France to learn medical science and military techniques and law. It was like what Peter the Great had done in Russia.

³⁸ Zalman Isakowich, p. 14.

In 1826 a large group of young Egyptians were sent to France³⁹. Mohammad Ali sent about 300 Egyptian students to Europe (France and Italy) during his power. Even a university was established in Paris particularly for Egyptian students. One might say he was fond of west. Then the country took a new face day by day and a new institute, factory or foundation with western spirit and culture was established every day. This emplaces and interest in France during Mohammad Ali and his successor's age reveals the power of French industry and military in this land and among its leaders. Such inferiority from rulers against dominant power could be found in many Asian and African colonies and their leaders. So that after ending political and military age of oppressors, the lands were still fond of their power and following European culture was recommended to become free from their awkwardness. Based on such reforms in Egypt, more initials for combining western and eastern cultures were provided. Consequently, given evolutions took place which covered routine lifestyle, clothing... of those people who contacted Europeans more than other people. Egypt leaders thought that in order to fight with western monsters, they should resort to their own weapon. They only considered reinforcing military structure, reforming official, educational and industrial situations by following western industry. Another factor for penetrating western thoughts in Egypt was immigration of Europeans to this country. By beginning U.S. civil wars, European merchants paid attention to Egypt for the purpose of achieving wool industries and Suez Canal. During Mohammad Ali's incumbency, 10000 Europeans stayed in Egypt and this number went up to 33000 individuals until 1863. They were mainly living in Cairo,

³⁹ "Heyworth. Dunne", J. An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt", London 1939, p. 106.

Alexandria and other big cities in Egypt⁴⁰. Capitulation existed in Egypt and Europeans took advantage of exclusive rights and privileges in industrial, commercial and financial activities.

These groups of Europeans were considered as life patterns and exact mirror of all cultural and moral values of western lands in the hearts of rich and high classes in Egyptian society. This class of society had more contact with Europeans and after a while completely changed into European appearance as well as their behaviors and customs. Gradually they became the element of transfer and canals for penetrating in the structure of the country. However it should be mentioned that such an approach first looked into surface aspects of west and then led to hardware aspect of this civilization. For example, those youngsters who were sent to Europe for education were not ready to perceive Eastern Europe society and its moral values correctly. Islamic life style and Sunni's training prevented them to understand their concept properly. Naturally there were also some intellectuals in Egypt who could overcome the conflicting barriers by their elaborate thoughts. They could not only understand the features of such stranger's customs and lifestyles but also recognize their socio-political lives. To understand the position of these individuals against west achievements it is necessary to mention Abdol Rahman Jabrooti's text about one of the powerful Mamluk Beik's journey to England: "He learnt a lot in England: governing system of the country, appropriate policy, financial welfare, industrial growth, their fare treatment with farmers, and their religious indulgence. He did not find any signs of poverty, beggars and people in need."⁴¹ The last sentence above indicates fondness due to

⁴⁰ Ali Mohammad Naqavi, "Sociology of Westernization" Vol 2. Amir kabir Pub. Tehran 1998, P. 50.

⁴¹ Vignon L. "La France dans l'Afrique du Nord. Algerie et Tunisie, Paris 1889, P. 116.

wrong understanding and superficial feeling. He was so fascinated with beauty and glamour in west that was unable to see the clearest and most obvious phenomena of a society, e. g huge poverty of labors in the 19th century in England and dictatorship by Victorian monarchy. Nevertheless, the impact of such interpretations and attitude with west in formation of Arab world's thoughts and movements cannot be denied. The process of europization began in the lives and social knowledge of the most progressive Arab countries. This stage of awakening can be deemed as Arab world 'Renaissance', the Renaissance which is based on all aspects of cultural life including new Arab literature, Islamic enlightening and reforming movement.